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Social extremity, communities of fate,
and the sociology of SARS
[...] The uninteresting lives of men so
entirely given to the actuality of the bare
existence have their mysterious side.
(Joseph Conrad, Typhoon)
F           in recent times have proved so rich in surprises
as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) saga of spring
 (). Among a number of oddities, consider for the moment just
one. Only weeks before the SARS crisis publicly erupted in March ,
the United Nations was in acrimonious disarray. A divided Security
Council had failed to agree on strategies to disarm Saddam Hussein and
to impede a war against him. Yet just as pundits were announcing the
death of the UN, SARS suddenly gave one branch of it ¢ the World
Health Organization (WHO) ¢ renewed energy and respectability. It is
the most basic axiom of international relations that states are jealous to
preserve their prerogatives and ‘‘sovereignty’’, of insisting that other
countries and organizations do not meddle in their internal aﬀairs. But
the Global Alert and Respiratory Unit of the WHO managed not only to
forge an unprecedented degree of cooperation among disease laborato-
ries scattered across the planet; it was also able to elevate itself to the
extraordinary position of global judge and jury. Governments ¢ in
mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore and
Canada ¢ quaked at its pronouncements, feared its travel advisories and
pleaded to be released from them. To use a ubiquitous metaphor of the
time, the ‘‘war’’ against SARS was the epitome of the UN ideal: a wor-
thy defense against a common, unequivocal foe, under the auspices of a
truly pan-national organization.
() I am grateful to Gary Alan Fine,
Daniel Gordon, Neil McLaughlin and
Volker Meja for their critical comments
on an earlier draft of this paper.
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This article examines SARS’s impact on Hong Kong, a territory
whose global importance is disproportionate to its size of  square
kilometers and population of almost seven million (). A logistics hub
that has become simultaneously a disease hub, transporting pathogens
such as the SARS coronavirus around the world, Hong Kong’s condi-
tion cannot be one of indiﬀerence to the international system as a
whole (). Moreover, something happened in Hong Kong that provides
us with a new, or at least re-fashioned, concept for sociological theory. A
chief objective in what follows is to delineate a social phenomenon, a
child of ordeal and emergency, that became vivid in Hong Kong during
the spring of  but which is by no means an unparalleled event: the
formation of ‘‘a community of fate’’ that both ampliﬁed political ‘‘voice’’
and increased the ratio of alert to inert denizens (cf. Hirschman ,
p. ).
I begin by delineating the key concept of this paper, ‘‘community of
fate’’; proceed to apply it to Hong Kong in the spring of ; and then
examine its signiﬁcance for sociology. Of special pertinence is the nature
of social ritual, what may be called ‘‘eﬀace work’’, in a masked city
fearful of bodily contact and co-presence. I shall argue that mask culture
under these conditions promotes emotional contagion, while keeping
disease contagion at bay.
() Current economic data on Hong
Kong, often with international rankings,
can be found in the Hong Kong Year-
book published by the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region government.
It is also available online at: [http: //www.
info.gov.hk/yearbook/]. On Hong Kong’s
foreign reserves see [http: //info. gov.hk/
hkma/eng/press//e.html].
On trade: [http: //info.gov.hk/
censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/ex-trade/trade/
trade.htm]. Regionally, the power of
Hong Kong is immense. Over the last
two decades, Hong Kong has been the
biggest contributor to the Chinese
mainland’s foreign direct investment; in
 it supplied one-third of it. Hong
Kong companies now employ in Guang-
dong province approximately  million
workers. Hong Kong is also part of the
Pearl River Delta, a region that boasts a
GDP of more than $ billion, and
which is the world’s sixteenth biggest
economy and tenth largest exporter. See
‘‘Asia Ascending’’, Economist June ,
, p. ; also ‘‘A Strong Tailwind’’,
Business Week [Asian Edition]) Sept. ,
, p. .
() It was on ships arriving from Hong
Kong that bubonic plague ﬁrst entered
the United States. Honolulu and San
Francisco were struck in . Within
a decade the disease had reached
Texas and Florida. It has never been
entirely eliminated from continental
America.
 
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Community of Fate Defined
To most readers of this article, ‘‘community of fate’’ will be an arcane
notion. Social scientists who employ it do so sparingly, and almost in
passing, as in the distinction between communities of choice (better oﬀ
neighborhoods able to maximize security and safety) and communities
of fate (poor neighborhoods, with fewer resources to defend themselves
against crime and other social injuries) (). Communitarian writers
appear to have no place for it in their casuistries (). Nor does the master
of the sustained, inﬂected deﬁnition, Erving Goﬀman, who summons
‘‘community of fate’’ only to render it as little more than a synonym for
collegiality (). Even a book that contains the concept in its title avoids
ﬂeshing out its meaning; on that reckoning, community of fate is tanta-
mount to risk society (Marske ) ().
In the following discussion, community of fate is a term that depicts a
process of group formation under extreme duress. It refers to a pattern
of temporary social cohesion arising from a mass emergency or ‘‘disas-
ter’’. Many sociologists since Durkheim and Mauss have observed that
‘‘institutions have a tendency to reveal themselves when they are stressed
and in crisis’’ (Klinenberg , p. ). Communities of fate are rather
diﬀerent: they come into being as a result of stress and crisis, instantiating
a mode of life that hitherto was only nascent, and interrupting the
complacent doze of routine. They are also socially productive and
consequential, which means capable of collective action for the brief
time they are in existence. Quintessentially local, symbolically and
materially bounded, community of fate is not to be confused with ‘‘risk
society’’ which depicts something chronic rather than acute, general
rather than particular, modern rather than trans-temporal, and vaguely
recognized by its recipients rather than being viscerally grasped. Com-
munity of fate falls under the aegis of conﬂict, social ritual and resource
mobilization theories many of whose dynamics it accordingly shares.
() Hope  p. .
() However, Selznick’s sophisticated
treatment of community as a variable,
rather than as an all-encompassing set of
social relationships, does invoke the
notion of a ‘‘common faith or fate’’
(Selznick , p. ).
() Colleagues, for Goﬀman (
[], pp. -) are deﬁned as ‘‘per-
sons who present the same routine to the
same kind of audience but who do not
participate together, as team mates do, at
the same time and place before the same
particular audience’’. He adds that
‘‘whatever their tongues, they come to
speak the same social language’’.
() On fate’s relationship to risk, see
Beck , pp. -.
  
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‘‘Fate’’ in this context denotes an unwanted, yet socially recognized,
emergency which confronts people with a major challenge to their
existence (). If people possess resources, including organization and
leadership, if there are one or more axes on which their interests can
converge, they are in principle able to grapple with this fate actively and
purposefully. ‘‘Community’’ refers to the sense that, other divisions and
interests notwithstanding, agents recognize a common danger, face an
uncertain and diﬀuse menace, and are able collectively to do something
about it. This is not the same as saying that everyone feels exactly the
same way, behaves the same way, or has the same death chances, a recap-
itulation of ‘‘mechanical solidarity’’ (). It is to aﬀirm, however, that a
common focus of sustained attention, and an intense feeling of hori-
zontal interconnectedness, is essential ().
Concatenated ‘‘pockets of solidarity’’ (Collins , p. ), commu-
nities of fate are of smaller or larger size. What quintessentially typiﬁes
them is a powerful sense of group membership (as distinct from a spasm
of altruism) which generates, and via feedback requires, group symbols
and energies. Where all hope is gone, resources ‘‘spent’’ and action
deemed hopeless, communities of fate are impossible. Candidates for
such communities include ravaged towns, besieged cities, and quaran-
tined areas, yet neither depredation, nor siege, nor cordon sanitaire is
suﬀicient for a community of fate to form. Manifest for a shorter or
longer period of time, a community of fate never imagines itself to be
living in ‘‘normal times’’. On the contrary, it experiences time as a rup-
ture with the recent past: the biblical kairos whose break with linearity
jolts people into new or intensiﬁed ways of feeling. That sensibility is
also epitomized by the stirring lines of the ancient Sumarian/Babylonian
Epic of Gilgamesh:
() The term ‘‘community of fate’’ (as
Schicksalsgemeinschaft) appears in Weber
( [], pp. , , ; and 
[], pp. , , ), and is
advanced at length in Bauer (
[/]), as part of a discussion of
nationhood.
() Unlike mechanical solidarity, pre-
dicated on anatomical and functional
resemblance, communities of fate can be
highly stratiﬁed. Equally, while mecha-
nical solidarity refers to an extant, pre-
established group of everyday life, a
community of fate is a group in the
making. It emerges through trial and
conﬂict and evaporates once these
conditions disappear.
() Though not necessarily the
‘‘horizontal comradeship’’ or ‘‘frater-
nity’’ of which Anderson ( [],
p. ) writes. Despite the cachet that
‘‘imagined communities’’ has received
over the years, I avoid this circular
concept. Not just the nation but all
communities ¢ all social relations ¢ are
‘‘imagined’’ in some sense or other
because they are mediated by thought.
But then again thought is itself the
mediated expression of social relations.
 
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Enkidu was weakened, could not run as before,
but now he had reason, and wide understanding.
(Epic of Gilgamesh I pp. -; Standard Version)
The above portrait hints at, but does not describe rigorously, the
seven factors that produce a community of fate. Let me now turn to
these explicitly using the SARS crisis in Hong Kong as an exemplary
case.
SARS in Hong Kong: Sociology of an Epidemic Disease
The British handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in July  was supposed to herald a new chapter in the
territory’s history, combining economic prosperity with growing attach-
ment to the Motherland. Instead, Hong Kong’s retrocession to the PRC
coincided with the Asian ﬁnancial meltdown, aggravated further by a
newly installed government that appeared to lack the rudiments of good
governance (). Already before SARS appeared in late February ,
triggering three months of fear, , cases, and  deaths, Hong Kong
was a troubled place (). Yet its travails had been largely segmental in
character, aﬀecting diﬀerent groups in somewhat diﬀerent ways or
concentrating misfortune on a minority. Economic recession and
downsizing throw some people out of employment, while others retain
their jobs. A period of deﬂation may damage retailers, but for customers
whose wages and salaries remain stable or increase, there are bargains to
be had. Falling property prices ¢ they lost around two-thirds of their
market value in ﬁve years ¢ aﬀect only that minority in Hong Kong who
are in the private housing market. Avian ﬂu destroyed the livestock of
chicken farmers and sellers, but there is always other meat to buy and,
in extremis, other professions to pursue. In contrast, SARS aﬀected
everyone more or less simultaneously (). It announced a collective,
() Good governance in Hong Kong
is itself impeded by the structure
imposed on it by the Basic Law, the city’s
so-called mini-constitution. Hong
Kong’s political system is one of
‘‘authoritarian toleration’’. I attempt a
detailed analysis of its vulnerabilities in
Baehr . For a convenient edition of
the Basic Law, see Chan and Clark .
() Given that inﬂuenza alone kills
around , people each year in the
United States, the oﬀicial number of
SARS’ combined fatalities in all countries
¢  ¢ looks unimpressive. Yet this is
hindsight. At the time, because SARS
was a new virus, epidemiological extra-
polation was impossible; no one knew
what the ﬁnal death tally would be.
() For economic data on SARS’s
immediate impact, see Cheung and
Sung (), and Brown (). Useful
sources on the outbreak are: DeGolyer
  
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rather than an idiosyncratic fate, a dramatic rupture with quotidian
existence rather than, as with illnesses such as cancer or heart disease,
yet another statistic of everyday death ().
To assume the characteristics of a community of fate at least seven
factors must conjoin. In the ﬁrst place, a community of fate requires
danger recognition: people’s understanding that they are faced by a
hazard so pressing, so immediate and so evident as to demand their
urgent attention (). They must be aware of the peril that confronts
them ¢ not aware of all its implications (an impossibility), but suﬀi-
ciently knowledgeable to comprehend that they are in the midst of a
menace that threatens their very existence. Without that recognition, a
human group may be destroyed or decimated innocent of what has hit it,
as was the case with the South East Asian areas struck by the earthquake
¢ induced tsunami in December . Indonesia, one of the aﬀected
countries, is no stranger to similar kinds of natural catastrophe. Ten
weeks before the volcanic island of Krakatoa erupted on August 
, killing over , people, it produced ominous signs of the
deluge it would later unleash. Residents of Batavia (Jakarta) felt dis-
concerting vibrations they had never before experienced. A recent
chronicler of the events nicely sums up the phenomenology of danger
recognition:
There had been a curious trajectory about each person’s morning on that day.
They had awakened to the unusual sounds, and they had been merely puzzled. By
the time they breakfasted, they had become concerned. The Christians among
them had gone oﬀ to their churches, feeling moderately alarmed. After matins they
had ventured back out on to the streets, by now in their droves, and they were, at
least privately, in moods that were at ﬁrst quite agitated and, as the thunder wore
on, very apprehensive indeed. (Winchester , p. )
Yet two days later ‘‘after its alarming opening salvo, the island
quietened down again’’ (Winchester , p. ). Life returned to
normal. People resumed their professions and distractions. The talk of
(), Fidler (), Lee () and
Loh et al (). The documents of
three public enquiries are also invaluable:
see SARS Expert Committee ;
Hospital Authority ; Legislative
Council of Hong Kong .
() As Abraham (, pp. -)
remarks, ‘‘Earlier crises [in Hong Kong]
had brought political and economic
uncertainty... But now, in addition to all
this, there was something new. There was
the elemental fear of illness and death.
And no one seemed to be exempt. It was
not just those in crowded housing estates
who were falling ill. The powerful and
wealthy were also at risk... In those dark
days in March, SARS seemed to be a
disease that could strike anyone, any-
time’’.
() Recognition of an emergency is
typically a processual, rather than a
spontaneous, act of cognition. For an
acute analysis of its dynamics, see Bob-
bitt (, p. ) who itemizes its ﬁve
stages: notice, deﬁnition, decision, assi-
gnment, and implementation.
 

available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000397560500007X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 15:57:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
the town was the much heralded visit of Wilson’s Great Circus.
Danger-recognition lapsed. The forces that would smash Krakatoa to
smithereens ¢ the dynamics of tectonics, subductions, fault-zones and
sea-ﬂoor spread ¢ were unknown at this time. When the volcanic island
did ﬁnally blow up, hurling devastating tsunamis at its neighbors, it was
too late for action or ﬂight.
Danger recognition thus has its own micro-moments: it may be
activated, falter, reassert itself or abate once more. In the case of SARS
in Hong Kong, with an advanced communication system, a crisis was
evident to most people from around March   onwards (),
possibly before, dramatized by a daily recorded death toll, a government
call to arms on March  in which citizens were enjoined to combat the
disease, and by the WHO travel advisory against non-essential visits to
Hong Kong and Guangdong issued on April .
Second, the formation of a community of fate requires not only
danger recognition but also moral density, namely, a pervasive and
intense feeling of social interconnectedness in which people are aware of
a common predicament and a common interest that stretches beyond the
family unit. Moral density, in this adaptation of Durkheim, is not iden-
tical to altruism which is only one ¢ and probably the rarest ¢ of its
modalities. It is enough that people believe their own fate is tied up with
others close to them and that emotional contagion (in this case, of fear
and anxiety) sweeps through their collective life. I will describe the
mechanism of this contagion presently, when I discuss ‘‘eﬀace work’’.
Even so, danger recognition and moral density are insuﬀicient factors
to elicit a community of fate. Pertinent, too, is the length of time the
emergency lasts: an isolated event may shake a people from its slumber,
but is unlikely to instill the necessary vitality to keep it awake. Another
way of putting this is to say that communities of fate are formed by trial
rather than by shock (or awe), by sustained, chronic ordeal rather than by
acute anguish ¢ unless, of course, a shock repeats itself periodically in
which case it takes on the features of a trial. In Hong Kong that ordeal
was recapitulated daily in the reports of new infections, but was given
added drama by a series of events that over a two month period brought
home the gravity of the situation: the outbreak around March  in the
Prince of Wales Hospital Ward a, which aﬀected more than  health-
care workers; the Amoy Gardens infections of late March-early April
which ended up killing  people and which catalyzed the WHO travel
advisory; the report on April  of SARS among  families in the Lower
Ngau Tau Kok Estate, a building complex across the road from Amoy
() When the ﬁrst ﬁve SARS deaths were conﬁrmed.
  
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Gardens provoking fears that the disease was becoming airborne or
being carried by vectors such as rats and cockroaches; the much publi-
cized and grieved death on May  of Joanna Tse Yuen-man, the young
and vulnerable doctor who volunteered to work in a SARS unit in Tuen
Mun public hospital and who came to symbolize all that Hong Kong
people admired (); an outbreak in late May at the Lek Yuen Estate in
Sha Tin in which eleven residents, including a four-month-old baby,
were infected; the search, again in late May, for guests who had stayed
earlier in the month at Harbour Plaza Hotel where one of their number
had gone down with SARS. And these were only the major local events
which kept hearts racing. Meanwhile, the Chinese mainland was in
pandemonium; Beijing was not removed from the WHO’s list of SARS
aﬀected areas until June . So despite the general fall in SARS’
casualties revealed in Figure , new outbreaks ¢ represented by small
graphical spikes ¢ kept Hong Kong people on tenterhooks.
Fourth, a community of fate is formed where people feel compelled
to stand their ground, where there is little, if any, chance of ﬂight or of
individual escape from the common lot and where they experience their
predicament as collective exile (). This situation may be called clo-
sure. Accompanying it is social condensation as energies that would
normally be dissipated are concentrated in one place. Closure is unusual.
When, in , a bubonic plague epidemic hit Hong Kong, the bulk of
the Chinese population ¢ around , ¢ simply ﬂed. That response
was repeated exactly a century later in the north Indian city of Surat
where news of plague sparked a mass exodus of half a million that
included most of the medical profession (Marriott , p. ) ().
Furthermore, Hong Kong society balkanized in  along racial and
ethnic lines. White colonists and Chinese workers, xenophobic mirrors
both, blamed each other for the crisis; clung to opposed therapeutic
diagnoses and remedies; and were granted diﬀerent medical facilities
(Marriott , pp. -). Attempts at eﬀective quarantine collapsed
(Welsh , pp. -). The situation was radically diﬀerent
() Eight health-care workers died
from SARS, of whom six worked in the
public sector. The deaths of the public
sector medical staﬀ received enormous
amounts of publicity. The six were doc-
tors Joanna Tse Yuen-man,  y.o., and
Kate Cheng Ha-yan,  y.o., male nurse
Lau Wing-kai,  y.o., and three health-
care assistants, Wong Kang-tai,  y.o.,
Tang Heung-may,  y.o., and Lau
Kam-yung,  y.o. James Lau Tai-kwan,
 y.o., and Thomas Cheung Sik-hin,
 y.o., were the two private doctors who
died.
() The experience of exile and iso-
lation is the leitmotif of Albert Camus’s
The Plague. See Camus ( [])
pp. , -,-, etc.
() When the plague struck Bombay
in , approximately , people
(half the city’s population) retreated to
the hinterland (Marriott , p. ).
 
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      
with SARS in . Then it was mostly expatriate families that
left brieﬂy, ethnic divisions were insigniﬁcant, and modern medical
science ¢ through the agency of hospital doctors ¢ received common
approval.
It is true that Hong Kong people are notoriously peripatetic. Around
 % of them have right of abode in other countries, while around  %
have close relatives living elsewhere, thus aﬀording a temporary foreign
refuge. But moving is easier said than done when employment continues
and when local family commitments must be redeemed. Many cities on
the Chinese mainland were demonstrably unwelcoming of Hong Kong
visitors. And in Toronto, a home from home for many Hong Kongers,
even relatives often stated in so many words: ‘‘Stay away for the moment;
don’t put us in danger too’’.
Moreover, the implications of closure became more pointed still
when they took institutional forms. Salient examples included the travel
advisory of April , the ﬁrst on Hong Kong ever issued by the WHO,
which had a severe, if temporary, dampening aﬀect on economic acti-
vity (); the Swiss government’s prohibition, on the same day, of Hong
() Over , businesses folded
between March and the beginning of
June, and Hong Kong’s unemployment
rate, at around  %, was the highest since
. SARS’s impact on tourism (the
occupancy rate fell to  % in April and
May), airlines (Cathay Paciﬁc’s usual
ﬁgure of , passengers a day fell
to around , in April and May),
consumer spending, and the property
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Kong exhibitors (and those from other SARS aﬀected countries) from
participation in the Basel World Watch and Jewelry Show; the
announcement on May  from the University of California, Berkeley,
that students from countries on the WHO’s travel advisory list would
not be allowed to attend the summer school program (); and the
request, soon afterwards from Case Western Reserve University in
Cleveland, Ohio, the University of Rochester, in New York, and
Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, that students in SARS
areas skip their graduation ceremonies. That was not the end of it. Reed
Exhibitions, the organizers of the world’s premier jewelry trade show in
Los Angeles, ﬁrst banned Hong Kong exhibitors from attendance, then
allowed them to do so on condition that a separate pavilion be built for
them, and ﬁnally demurred to full participation provided the luckless
jewelers left Hong Kong ten days early, received health checks  hours
before entering the fair and presented up-to-date health certiﬁcates.
Meanwhile on May , the Hong Kong government was informed by its
Irish counterparts that Hong Kong athletes were debarred from parti-
cipating in the  Special Olympics World Summer Games ().
From an outsider’s point of view, such constraints and interdictions are
reasonable precautionary measures designed to protect the citizens of
host countries. But from the standpoint of many Hong Kong residents,
they suggested that ‘‘Asia’s world city’’ had become an international
outlaw.
Above I listed four ingredients that constitute a community of fate:
danger recognition (alertness based on veriﬁed public knowledge of the
disease); moral density (aided by the fact that SARS, albeit unequally, ran
its course through all major districts of Hong Kong); trial rather than
shock; and closure with its attendant stigmatization by other nations.
These are all necessary conditions for a community of fate to be formed.
Additional requirements include material and organizational resources to
resist the menace (for instance, a combative media in Hong Kong’s case),
and an axis of convergence (notably a common language, civic pride and
so forth) along which social cohesion is aﬀirmed. The existence of such
an axis can never be simply assumed. Consider Montreal during the
smallpox outbreak in . At the time of the epidemic, Montreal
boasted a city population of around , people; the suburbs
market, are detailed in Cheung and Sung
() and Brown ().
() After protest from the WHO, the
decision was rescinded on May .
() The decision was reversed on
June  (subject to quarantine conditions)
but for three weeks this incident provo-
ked a hue and cry in the Hong Kong
media, aggravated by the pathos that the
athletes in question were physically
impaired.
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accounted for some , more. Like Hong Kong, Montreal was a
commercial hub of the region. Unlike Hong Kong, where SARS
produced a community of fate, smallpox in Montreal only accentuated
previous divisions. The city fractured along lines of ethnicity (Anglo-
Irish/French), confession (Protestant/Roman Catholic), language
(Anglophone/Francophone), and neighbourhood (East End/West End).
No axis of convergence materialized, even though Montreal had the
resources and know-how to tackle the disease. Even treatment of the
disease sowed discord: a rump of miasmatic doctors claimed that vacci-
nation was pernicious. At this time, the germ theory of disease was still
in its infancy ().
By contrast, territory-wide identiﬁcation in Hong Kong was faci-
litated by a most propitious axis of convergence: ethnic homogeneity.
Of Hong Kong’s population of . million (mid- government
ﬁgures), around % are ethnic Chinese, approximately % were
() Yet perhaps matters are more
complex that I am making them appear.
My account of Montreal relies on the
study by Michael Bliss ( []), a
noted Canadian historian of medicine
who emphasizes the city’s social dissen-
sion. But perhaps another investigation,
guided by the model proposed here,
might show that Montreal did contain
one or more communities of fate. On that
account, we would not treat the city of
Montreal as a single unit, but examine
instead the inner dynamics of the East
and West sides. Another example might
be San Francisco’s Chinatown ¢ ‘‘a tenth
of the city terraced into twelve tiny
blocks’’ (Chase , p. ) ¢ during the
plague epidemic of . Chinese resi-
dents (virtually all males) were cordoned
oﬀ, quarantined, and viliﬁed as being
responsible for the disease. Distinctive
looks, diet and attire ¢ the typical queue
or pigtail was emblematic of residual
Manchu loyalty ¢ physically set apart
this group from its Caucasian neighbors.
Yet local authorities such as the powerful
merchant-based Chinese Benevolent
Association, and the Chinese consul, Ho
Yow, ensconced in his oﬀicial Chinatown
residence, spoke up for their country folk
and defended their interests. Perhaps
there are also occasions in which com-
munities of fate exist as a nested struc-
ture much like a series of Russian
matryoshka dolls. These are intriguing
possibilities that only research, and
greater analytical precision, could subs-
tantiate. But they do not negate the
concept I am developing here; they sim-
ply extend its implications and lend it a
more realistic air. They suggest, plausi-
bly, that communities of fate have macro,
meso and micro expressions. Or, to use a
diﬀerent language, that communities of
fate may form in both ‘‘cellular’’, relati-
vely homogenous entities, and ‘‘spectral’’
ones which cut across many divisions.
For sociological purposes, the latter are
far more intriguing and for an obvious
reason: the more solidaristic a social
group is to begin with, the less it requires
greater solidarity to cope with a parlous
condition. Defensive consolidation of a
pre-existing pattern is quite diﬀerent
from group formation of a new one. In
contrast, the more spectral the group that
becomes a community of fate ¢ essenti-
ally the more strangers it composes and
the more stratiﬁed its occupational,
confessional and civic life ¢ the more
remarkable it is. The city as a whole is
thus a legitimate level of focus to the
extent that one sees it as a ‘‘parent com-
munity’’ (Jacobs  [], p. ; cf.
p. ) in relation to its districts and nei-
ghborhoods, or as a ‘‘complex social sys-
tem of integrated institutions that touch
and interpenetrate in a variety of ways’’
(Klinenberg , p. , emphasis in the
original).
  

available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000397560500007X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 05 Jan 2017 at 15:57:49, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
T A B L E I
Hong Kong Transition Project Data Set
The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of yourself ?
(All ﬁgures shown in percentages [%])
born in the territory, and the vast majority of residents are Cantonese
speakers, the language associated with Guangdong Province. More-
over, the cultural identity of Hong Kongers is strong. Respondents
asked by the Hong Kong Transition Project to choose among various
self-ascribed identities ¢ as Chinese, as Hong Kong Chinese, or as
a Hong Kong person ¢ have repeatedly aﬀirmed attachment to the
last designation (Hong Kong person) or to one that combines a sense
of place and of ethnicity (Hong Kong Chinese). Self-descriptions of
being simply ‘‘Chinese’’ ¢ correlating with mainland patriotism ¢
have only intermittently garnered more than % of responses,
though this may be changing as residents continue to lose conﬁ-
dence in their own territory’s government and perceive the successes of
the PRC under a pragmatic and relatively eﬀective administra-
tion ().
() Table  shows no signiﬁcant rise
in the number of people who described
themselves as Hong Kong persons in the
Hong Kong Transition Project’s June
 
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Finally, social ritual is also critical in galvanizing a community of
fate’s collective life. This can take many diﬀerent forms but its conse-
quence is always the same: by providing a speciﬁc identity, relevant to
the crisis community, it separates the group both from normal life and
from the world of the unaﬀected. Let us call social ritual during the
Hong Kong SARS crisis ‘‘eﬀace work’’ ¢ the activity of wearing a mask
in public places.
Efface Work and the Mass Media
One’s face, then, is a sacred thing, and the
expressive order required to sustain it is
therefore a ritual one. (Goﬀman 
[], p. )
SARS can be understood epidemiologically as a virus that tested
Hong Kong’s health care system and governance to the maximum.
Sociologically it can be seen as a test of Hong Kong’s moral existence:
how the city and its environs coped with fear. The ancient notion that
plague is a sign of evil is no primitive superstition. It grasps the reality
that any threat to the group as a whole is simultaneously a ‘‘sacred’’
violatory event of the most extreme kind (see Gordon , p. ). The
specter of plague or any other pandemic summons up the possibility of a
collective death: the extirpation of the social itself.
Aside from the new institutions it generates (civic and government
initiatives, pressure groups, etc.), how does one recognize a community
of fate and delineate its existence? Durkheim ( [], pp. -)
claimed to ﬁnd the index of forms of solidarity in law and attitudes
towards punishment and compensation. One vital index of a community
of fate, I suggest, is to be found in the ‘‘social language’’ (Goﬀman 
[], p. ), symbols and ‘‘codes of representation’’ () that people
use to describe their predicament. More precisely, a community of fate
can be located by investigating what people saliently speak about; how
they speak about it i.e. with what terms and metaphors; and with what
sensibility.
SARS survey (). However it does
show a brief, but untypical, decline in
those describing themselves simply as
‘‘Chinese’’.
() On community of fate as a ‘‘code
of representation’’ see Bauer 
[/], p. .
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Elsewhere, I examine this language, particularly its Chinese articu-
lation, in some detail. Here I will only sketch its main dimensions. What
Hong Kong people spoke about was the disease itself. Was it abating or
spreading? What could be done to stop it? How safe were one’s children
and relatives? Should domestic helpers be permitted to leave their
employers’ apartments for the usual Sunday gatherings in Central (the
ﬁnancial and government district) and elsewhere? By deﬁnition, this is
not the usual language of everyday life but when it momentarily beco-
mes so it articulates by repetition the new reality. How did Hong Kong
residents speak about SARS? Short of a genuine ethnography, we
cannot be certain. But in both Chinese and English language media,
metaphors of war were pervasive. Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s Chief
Executive, announced early on that ‘‘we [government ministers] are
conﬁdent that we [Hong Kong people] will win the war’’ (). Nurses
and doctors were described ubiquitously, by government oﬀicials, media
and citizens as ‘‘front line’’ workers (qianxian) and, albeit with milita-
ristic hyperbole, as ‘‘troops’’ (jundui) that are ‘‘marching through the
fog’’ (). Hong Kong’s premier English-language newspaper, the
South China Morning Post, organized ‘‘Operation Shield’’ to raise funds
for the ‘‘embattled’’ medics. Medals were dispensed to the dead; their
bodies buried in Gallant Garden.
Much of this disease-as-war language was government and media
‘‘frame’’. Its plausibility in the popular imagination can only be conjec-
tured. More evident is Hong Kong’s response to its ‘‘heroes’’, a term
widely used during the outbreak to describe medical staﬀ who died
trying to protect others. And here we approach the issue of moral sen-
sibility. For at the same time that Hong Kong people were bitterly cri-
ticizing their own government for what they deemed to be its general
incompetence, their hearts went out to those in the front line. Georg
Simmel ( [], pp. -) reminds us that gratitude is an
emotionally charged form of giving, supplementing the legal order;
unlike monetary exchange, it is ‘‘practical and impulsive’’. He adds that
although gratitude ‘‘may remain, of course something internal, it may
yet engender new actions’’. It forms part of ‘‘the moral memory of
mankind’’. That memory is today discernible in the bronze busts, titular
scholarships, and commemorations through which Hong Kong people
now recall the deceased health workers.
() Ta Kung Po,  March/, A
(reporter’s name not cited). Chinese has
various terms for war and battle, notably
zhang and zhan.
() Apple Daily  March/, A
(reporters Leung Shun-yu, Chui Doi-
ling, Chui Wan-ting, and Lai Ka-kui).
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If language was one key medium through which people communi-
cated a danger to their own existence as individuals and to the mortality
of the society of which they were part, social ritual was another. Here I
am less concerned with the persistence of established rituals than I am
with the emergence of new ones, peculiar to the situation itself.
Durkheim argued in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (
[]), that social solidarity requires the existence of bodies in close and
regular interaction, face-to-face encounters, to charge up a sense of a
common reality. In a powerful recent adaptation of this argument,
Randall Collins (, p. ) glosses:
Society is held together more intensely at some moments than at others. And
the ‘‘society’’ that is held together is no abstract unity of a social system, but is
just those groups of people assembled in particular places who feel solidarity with
each other through the eﬀects of ritual participation and ritually charged symbo-
lism.
Of particular importance, in Collins’s theory, is what he calls
‘‘emotional energy’’: the variable conﬁdence, élan, initiative and pur-
posefulness which people derive from ritual interactions and which by
social disposition they seek to maximize. Emotional energy is localized
and situation speciﬁc; it is most intense at the moment of the ritual itself,
tending to drain away thereafter unless and until it is periodically
renewed. It both belongs to and, in feedback loops, constitutes a ritual
encounter. In a ﬁgure that schematizes the ritual process, Collins (p. )
itemizes its four necessary ingredients: group assembly (bodily
co-presence), barrier to outsiders, mutual focus of attention and shared
mood (). Let us apply these ingredients to the Hong Kong case.
What kind of society was Hong Kong during the SARS crisis? I
am not thinking here of intensive units of interaction such as health
workers ¢ or New York ﬁreﬁghters in the aftermath of / ¢ who
handled the crisis around the clock, lived together for weeks on end so as
to avoid infecting their own families and who, by so doing, intensiﬁed
the bonds of their own solidarity pocket. My interest is in the wider
society, the ostensible spectators on events, as it were. What, if anything,
distinguished it symbolically from its previous social character? A sha-
red mood of trepidation was one feature, aggravated by the fact that
SARS was a new virus for which there was no known cure and that
mutated in unpredictable ways. A mutual focus of attention was another
factor, centered on daily (sometimes hourly) updates of SARS casualty
() Collins’s sociology of the emo-
tions extends Durkheim and Goﬀman,
but also builds on a burgeoning literature
e.g. Barbalet , Katz  and Scheﬀ
.
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statistics, and information about where the disease was spreading. And
there was a double barrier to outsiders: one elected by foreigners who
stopped coming to Hong Kong; the other generated, under pressure,
among Hong Kongers themselves for whom domestic strangers ¢ and
even intimates ¢ became a source of jeopardy as unwitting carriers of
the pestilence. Where, then, was the group-assembly, the close inter-
action that gives people a sense of belonging? Had it momentarily
disappeared? Or was there still some means by which it made an
appearance? Disease repels people from contact. It puts a premium on
co-absence. By minimizing bodily contact it must also attenuate solida-
rity and moral density, and thereby the presence of society itself. The
reality is more complex.
In a seminal essay, Erving Goﬀman coined the term ‘‘face work’’
to exemplify the many ways that individuals publicly challenge, apolo-
gize, cooperate and forgive one another in situations of co-presence.
‘‘A person’s performance of face work, extended by his tacit agreement
to help others perform theirs, represents his willingness to abide by
the ground rules of social interaction’’ (Goﬀman  [], p. ).
For Goﬀman, the self consists not just as an assemblage of ‘‘expressive
implications’’ but also as ‘‘a kind of player in a ritual game who copes
honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically, with
the judgmental contingencies of the situation’’ (p. ). ‘‘By repeatedly
and automatically asking himself the question: ‘If I do or do not act in
this way, will I or others lose face?’, he decides at each moment, cons-
ciously or unconsciously, how to behave’’ (p. ). As is well known,
Chinese culture attributes an especial importance to ‘‘face’’ and its
requirements (). The paradox of efface work begins, however, with the
face out of sight. Disease, too, is faceless, invisible, unlike a marauding
army, a volcanic lava ﬂow, a tsunami wave, or the violently swaying trees
that announce the arrival of a hurricane. And the more mysterious it is,
the more a disease is likely to induce generalized hypochondria. All
kinds of sundry illnesses are read as its symptoms: diarrhea, coughing,
fever.
Disease in Hong Kong is a remarkable laboratory to examine how
even in situations of social repulsion a collective existence is aﬀirmed.
Isolation has its social patterns and consequences. Granted, where pos-
sible, people in Hong Kong vacated the usual packed public spaces:
shopping malls, restaurants, churches, and cinemas. But for the most
() Signiﬁcantly, the ﬁrst footnote of
Goﬀman’s ‘‘Face-Work’’ essay is devo-
ted to Chinese conceptions of face. For a
more recent analysis, see Bond ,
pp. -.
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part ﬂight was impossible. People still went to work and, for at least
half of the period in which SARS was active, to school and to university.
Those without their own vehicles (the majority) were compelled to
employ public transport. Thus bodies remained co-present for much of
the time. Families still met, even if there was reluctance to keep up
contact with elder members ¢ the key target group of SARS deaths.
In a masked city it was diﬀicult to recognize the identity even of one’s
friends and colleagues as they passed. Yet mask wearing became the
quickly improvised, if obligatory, social ritual; failing to don one was
met with righteous indignation, a clear sign of ritual violation. The mask
symbolized a rule of conduct: namely an obligation to protect the wider
community; and an expectation regarding how one was to be treated by
others (Goﬀman  [], p. ). More simply, the mask was the
emblematic means by which people communicated their responsibilities
to the social group of which they were members. Through mimicry and
synchronization ¢ key mechanisms of emotional contagion (Hatﬁeld et
al. , pp. -) ¢ mask wearing amounted to a joint action, nor-
matively embodied, the entrainment and attunement of the society as a
whole. By disguising an individual’s face, it gave greater salience to col-
lective identity. By blurring social distinctions, it produced social
resemblance. Mask wearing activated and reactivated a sense of a com-
mon fate; it was a mode of reciprocity under conditions that supremely
tested it. Accordingly, mask demeanor was much more than a prophy-
lactic against disease. It showed deference to public emotions and the
decision to respect them. That throughout the crisis Health Secretary
Yeoh refused to wear a mask, saying that the virus was only transmissible
through intimate contact, was a social gaﬀe of the ﬁrst order. Note too
that eﬀace work ¢ precisely because it is a performance ¢ requires eﬀort.
Though this is not the emotional energy of attraction and enthusiasm,
and the antithesis of collective celebration, mask-wearing demands
activity: donning the mask, changing it every couple of hours, feeling it
become fetid with spittle, speaking through it in frustratingly muﬀled
tones, buying new masks, ripping them oﬀ in relief when back-stage. As
a contribution to general sociological theory, I suggest that SARS
showed that social ritual (as mask-wearing) can function even where
there is resistance to bodily contact, even where emotional energy is very
low, and even where a group uses an emblem that appears to symbolize the
opposite of integration.
But if the mask functioned as the most visible signal of Hong Kong’s
collective fate, it was by no means the only means through which a
common mood and focus of attention was generated. The mass media
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assumed a vital role (). To say it ‘‘constructed’’ SARS is obvious yet
simplistic. The media transmitted and ampliﬁed many of the images of
SARS (the masked city, heroes, war vocabulary); to that extent it was a
‘‘carrier group’’ (Alexander , p. ) of the public iconography. At
the same time, it was itself constituted by public debate which it recur-
sively channeled and for which it became a moral depository. The media
was the people’s bridge to each other at a time when co-presence was
inevitable but group assembly was avoided ¢ like the plague. The media
was also of great signiﬁcance during the SARS outbreak because Hong
Kong people, unlike their Chinese mainland counterparts, could trust it
and because, uncontrolled by the Communist Party, it was able to
monitor the government, call it to account, suggest remedies and, in
many instances of government hesitation, take the lead. In short, the
media was not drafted in by the government, or controlled by it, for the
purposes of public relations (). And particularly in an age of multiple
media channels aﬀorded by the world-wide web, attempts to monopolize
information are constantly tested. For instance, the Hong Kong
government was initially reluctant to give details about where SARS was
being discovered. Naming particular residential estates, it was said,
might breech personal privacy, have legal implications and cause panic.
A citizens’ initiative simply sidelined such legal niceties: four computer
buﬀs set up a website which gave the residential address of conﬁrmed
and suspected SARS cases. The website received ﬁve million hits
between April  and   and, compunction set aside, the govern-
ment relented (). On April  it established its own list of SARS-
aﬀected buildings. At the same time, newspapers released daily charts
and ﬁgures itemizing where SARS had appeared or where its course was
running. The upshot of this development was that Hong Kong residents
could see clearly the dispersion of SARS throughout the entire terri-
tory ¢ a factor that made Hong Kong as a whole, not just one part of it,
feel collectively embattled.
Never mind that SARS was unevenly distributed, concentrating in
Kwun Tong ( cases) in Kowloon (). The New Territories were
also badly hit ¢ Shatin had  cases, Taipo another . And while
() On the media’s role as a channel,
and not simply a shaper, of sensibility,
see Chan (, p. ), Loh et al. (,
p. ), Lee (, p. ), Cheung and
Sung (, p. ).
() This is what Eric Klinenberg
(, pp. -) suggests in his ana-
lysis of the Chicago heat wave of .
Duneier () contests this point. For a
response, see Klinenberg .
() Loh et al., , p. .
() Hong Kong is a geographical
expression for three contiguous areas:
Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the
New Territories.
 
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      
Number of SARS cases by geographical areas
Hong Kong island, the ﬁnancial and government center of the territory,
was left relatively unscathed,  people in the Eastern district still
contracted SARS. Cumulatively, that lent credence to the widespread
belief that SARS was either actually present in one’s own neighborhood
or within a short striking distance of it. Bottled up in their apartments,
making every attempt at work and on public transport to seal themselves
oﬀ from sources of contamination ¢ their fellows ¢ Hong Kongers in
another age would have felt largely impotent. It was radio, television and
to a lesser degree the internet that gave them hope, and that linked their
destiny to that of their faceless, bemasked compatriots.
Radio played a special role. Its regent (since deposed) was Albert
Cheng King-hon, the charismatic and pugnacious commentator whose
morning call-in program on Commercial Radio’s Teacup in a Storm (sic)
attracted around  % of Hong Kong radio listeners between . and
. am. Cheng established himself as the champion of health
workers and the scourge of government procrastination (). Programs
() I am drawing on my own obser-
vations and on Loh et al. (, pp. -
) who point out, with a roster of exam-
ples, that ‘‘the inﬂuence of media ﬁgures
like Albert Cheng [and his side-kick
Peter Lam] reinforced the impression
that the government was under siege, as
oﬀicials no longer seemed to be taking
  

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like his prompted one commentator to say that, during the SARS
episode, the ‘‘media became the true ‘intermediary’ that united diﬀerent
segments of the people and publicized their cause’’, helping them cope
with the uncertainty of SARS ‘‘more eﬀectively than any bureaucratic
measure’’ could ().
The term ‘‘intermediary’’ is striking for, in a famous passage,
Durkheim ( [], p. ) also notes the importance of what he
calls ‘‘tangible intermediaries’’ in constituting collective representations.
Durkheim observes that it is ‘‘by shouting the same cry, saying the same
words and performing the same action in regard to the same object that
[people] arrive at and experience agreement’’ ( [], p. ). The
same cry in the case of Hong Kong was ‘‘SARS’’ and lamentations
devoted to the dead; the same action was donning the mask, retreating to
the household and listening to or watching regular broadcasts of such
ampliﬁcatory and ‘‘tangible intermediaries’’ as radio, television. The
‘‘heroic front line health workers themselves’’ were SARS’ heroic
emblem, rather like ﬁreﬁghters in the case of /.
And when it was all over? ‘‘I feel like a survivor from a war zone’’
said Justin Wu Che-yuen, a Chinese University of Hong Kong clinical
tutor and Hospital Authority medical oﬀicer. ‘‘I and my colleagues
don’t feel like celebrating ¢ we knew Hong Kong would be taken oﬀ
the WHO [travel advisory] list. But there is a sense of relief today... At
the peak of the outbreak, I worried about the spread of the disease,
from public lifts to people on the street. You couldn’t trust anyone
because some people didn’t even know they had the virus ()’’.
Edmond Wong Chi-woon,  years old, scriptwriter of the ﬁlm ‘‘City of
SARS’’, concurred: ‘‘It’s been intense. Such a massive, massive expe-
rience for this city. It hit everything, from Hong Kong’s economy and its
place in the world to the way we touch each other. It’s not easy to squeeze
all that into  minutes. I think everyone working on the ﬁlm feels a
tremendous sense of responsibility’’. ‘‘I’m not sure if this ﬁlm even falls
into the same genre as all the other virus ﬁlms. If anything it is closer to a
movie about war being fought on the home front. Yes, that’s it ¢ a war
movie crossed with reality TV’’. Fellow director Peter Chan Ho-sun
added, ‘‘Something fundamental has changed in Hong Kong since
SARS. It doesn’t feel so lost any more (). We have something to cele-
the lead in providing guidance to the
public’’. On a number of occasions the
Hospital Authority and the government
changed direction following radio expo-
sure.
() Lee , p. .
() Quoted in a report by Alex Lo,
South China Morning Post June /
p. C.
() On SARS creating a ‘‘new sense
of being homed’’ following an ‘‘alien
SARS attack’’, see Lee  p. .
 
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brate’’ (). So it is that disease may provide an unexpected opportunity
for social life to be renewed. Daniel Gordon’s study of Marseilles,
during the plague of , shows how that epidemic, for all the suﬀering
it caused, and in good measure because of it, became a source of civic
pride, a badge of the city’s independence from the royal court of France
to which it was subordinated in . A vibrant commercial port and
vector of disease, Marseilles was cordoned oﬀ from the rest of France,
but thereby regained some of its lost autonomy. If Marseilles became
‘‘the ﬁrst instance in which disaster was used as an emblem of pride to
counteract the homogenizing tendencies of modernity’’ (Gordon ,
p. ), Hong Kong may be the latest.
Communities of fate, in the sense previously deﬁned, are productive,
not passive, bodies; they are socially consequential. What, then, did
SARS produce? The SARS crisis occurred during a period in which the
Hong Kong government sought to activate the slumbering Article  of
the Basic Law, a provision that requires the local government to ‘‘enact
laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, sub-
version against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state
secrets’’. Article  also instructs the HKSAR to ‘‘prohibit foreign
political organizations or bodies from conducting activities in the
Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region
from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies’’.
Even before the SARS outbreak, Article  provoked mounting anxiety
among Hong Kong people, as data from the Hong Kong Transition
Project shows clearly (), and as political agitation also revealed: in
December , around , people took to the streets in protest.
Published without a ‘‘white bill’’ which would have speciﬁed in detail the
precise legal formulae to be applied, government consultation on Article
 appeared peremptory and, even worse for a constitutional document,
ambiguous. Both the speciﬁc oﬀences of subversion and secession were
freshly created. The deﬁnition of what constituted ‘‘state secrets’’ was
broad and, bereft of a public interest defense, draconian; its implemen-
tation would have gagged, or at least intimidated, the academy and the
media. And the crime of sedition ¢ ‘‘inciting others... to commit the
substantive oﬀence of treason, secession or subversion... or [causing]
violence or disorder which seriously endangers the stability of the state
() South China Morning Post Maga-
zine June /, -. Article by Tom
Hilditch. The other ‘‘virus ﬁlms’’ to
which Wong is alluding include Out-
break,  Days Later, Twelve Monkeys,
and the  horror classic The Blob.
() Hong Kong Transition Project,
Accountability and Article  (Hong
Kong, Baptist University, ), pp. ,
, - and passim. The report is
available at [http: //www.hkbu.edu.hk/
∼hktp/].
  
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or the HKSAR’ ¢ included both speech acts and publications. No won-
der many believed that Article was a tyrant’s charter.
Meanwhile, SARS conﬁrmed many Hong Kongers’ worst fears
about Communist Party secrecy ¢ the seriousness of the disease was
originally covered-up ¢ and the major diﬀerence between their own
society and that of the mainland. If Article  had been in place and
enforceable, many Hong Kong people asked themselves, would their
own media have been able to monitor fearlessly the course of the disease,
speak out on behalf of local residents, and hold the government to
account for its tardiness and incompetence ()? And it was SARS’s
compression with previous government debacles, and the threat posed
by Article  that eventuated in the July   demonstration on Hong
Kong Island. The scale of the protest ¢ a march to the government
oﬀices in Central of over , people ¢ shocked the government and
surprised the demonstrators themselves. For the contrast with the
miserable spring days of March and April could hardly have been
greater or more dramatic. Then, people ﬂed public spaces ¢ restaurants,
cinemas, shopping malls, and public transport to the limited degree
it could be avoided ¢ and timidly conﬁned themselves to their apart-
ments. Now, in a major social eﬀervescence, a large cross section
of Hong Kong people ¢ pressed tightly together, unmasked and charged
up with a collective enthusiasm ¢ demanded political change.
Never before in Hong Kong’s history, had so many gathered at one event
to make political demands of their own local government. The result
was simultaneous and deeply alarming for Beijing. Two ministers resi-
gned. The Executive Council (the Hong Kong government’s cabinet)
hemorrhaged as the leader of the pro-business Liberal Party expressed
his dismay at government intransigence, while the pro-Beijing mass
party, which had supported Article , took a body blow to its prestige.
Article  was shelved and, as of this writing, has not yet been resusci-
tated.
On the mainland, a demonstration like July , and the civic initiatives
that presaged and accompanied it, would have been impossible, met by
police truncheons or worse. In Hong Kong, by contrast, July  marked a
() ‘‘Freedom of the press ceased to
be abstract when it was measured in
terms of the deaths of  people, the
infection of over one thousand and the
virtual collapse of key sectors of the
Hong Kong economy, including the
tourism and hospitality industry’’,
DeGolyer, op.cit., p. . A survey
conducted by Hong Kong University’s
Public Opinion Program, between April
 and April , revealed that only %
of respondents were satisﬁed with the
government’s performance; this was a
record low. See also Hong Kong Transi-
tion Project .
 
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period of hope that the government would be more receptive to local
demands and also facilitate what the Basic Law permits: universal and
direct elections, after  and  respectively, of the Chief Executive
and the Legislative Council (Legco). The November  District
Council election, with its resounding victory for the democratic
movement, lent further credence to that aspiration (). But just as
supporters of the democratic parties were pressing the Hong Kong
government to reveal its constitutional timetable, consultations were
chilled by mainland intervention. A stream of Communist Party oﬀicials
and lawyers, including some who had been among the drafters of the
Basic Law, lined up to announce in December  and January 
that electoral change was a ‘‘one nation’’, not a one system, aﬀair. A
delegation to Beijing in early February , led by the Chief Secretary
Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, was told in no uncertain terms that Hong
Kong’s process of political reform must abide by Basic Law ‘‘princi-
ples’’: acceptance of the mainland’s right to set the terms of constitu-
tional change; ‘‘gradual and orderly progress’’ that ﬁts the ‘‘actual’’
circumstances of Hong Kong; development that consolidates the
executive-led system; and reaﬀirmation that ‘‘patriots’’ should govern
Hong Kong (). Xu Chongde, a former Basic Law drafter, also remind-
ed Mr. Tsang’s taskforce that the Basic Law’s allusion to full democracy
refers to changes ‘‘subsequent’’ to , an indeterminate phrasing that
by no means sanctions immediate or rapid transformation. The result in
 was to freeze the political process for at least a further few years
albeit with some potential for increased representation (e.g. on the
committee that chooses the Chief Executive). In the September 
Legco elections, the pro-democracy camp won  % of the total votes
case (. % of the electorate voted in a system of great internal
complexity) but only  of Legco’s  seats. It is possible that the ‘‘July
eﬀect’’ and with it the SARS eﬀect, is now over.
Durkheim ( [-], p. ) observes that
We constantly have the impression of being surrounded with a host of things
in the course of happening whose nature escapes us. All sorts of forces move
themselves about, encounter one another, collide near us almost brushing us in
their passage; yet we go without seeing them until that time when some impressive
() With a .% (,,) turn-
out of registered voters, the District
Council election witnessed the Demo-
cratic Party securing  seats (up from
) and its main rival ¢ the pro-
government Democratic Alliance for the
Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) ¢
winning  seats (down from ). The
Democratic Party ﬁelded  candidates
while the DAB ﬁelded . Many other
democrat sympathizers, independent of
the two big parties, were elected.
() For further details, see the reports
in the South China Morning Post of
February  and , .
  
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culmination provides a glimpse of a hidden and mysterious event which has
occurred under our noses, but of which we had no suspicion and which we begin to
see only in terms of its results.
The ‘‘impressive culmination’’ of SARS, though not reducible to it
alone, was the July  protest. Whether it was a ‘‘turning point’’ in Hong
Kong’s evolution, or part of a broader ‘‘trajectory’’ (Abbott  [],
p. ) towards democracy ¢ or neither ¢ is not something we can yet
know. Nonetheless, it was the kind of socially consequential action that
communities of fate produce ().
Discussion: ‘‘Community of Fate’’ ¢Objections and Applications
As a social scientiﬁc concept, ‘‘community of fate’’ is open to at least
three rather diﬀerent sorts of complaint. First it may be objected that it
is inherently sentimental and unrealistic. Writing before the Nazi
deluge, Helmuth Plessner ( [], p. ) warned prophetically that
the ‘‘idol of this age is community’’, a notion that, in the face of life’s
hardness, ‘‘has compressed all sweetness into mawkishness, tenderness
into weakness, and ﬂexibility into the loss of dignity’’. Community, he
protested, is a saccharin concept ready made for all kinds of tendentious
purpose (). Yet hackneyed or dubious usage does not of itself disbar a
term from sociological employment; it if did, we would have to say adieu
to class, gender, status and citizenship. Careful deﬁnition is all we require
and social scientists have produced a range of sophisticated attempts to
oﬀer precisely that (notably Keller ; Delanty ; Cohen ).
Besides, this anticipated objection rests on a misunderstanding.
In my sense, the solidarity instantiated by a community of fate is based
not on altruism but on a focused sense of inter-connectedness and
() On other political and legal res-
ponses to disaster, see for instance, Fidler
(), Olson (), Shefner ().
For a theoretical account of Taiwan as a
‘‘community of fate,’’ see Chang (,
pp. -). For Chang, a community
of fate depends on a common legal
framework that ‘‘enables the construc-
tion of common experience and the
attainment of common good’’.
() Or as Raymond Williams (,
p. ) observed: ‘‘Community can be
the warmly persuasive word to describe
an existing set of relationships, or the
warmly persuasive word to describe an
alternative set of relationships. What is
most important, perhaps, is that
unlike all other terms of social organiza-
tion (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems
never to be used unfavorably...’’. Selz-
nick (), while agreeing with the
general thrust of William’s observation,
makes the converse point that ‘‘commu-
nity’’ is also often disparaged as small-
minded and claustrophobic.
 
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membership, not on love, but on danger, not on sympathy, but on fear.
It is not to be confused with the communitas that, according to
Victor Turner, accompanies the ritual process: a modality of social
relationship that blends homogeneity, equality, comradeship (). What
homogeneity there is concerns the common danger and uncertainty
that all face. This may lead to the sacriﬁcial comradeship of Weber’s
‘‘community of death’’ in which the self and the group are a mirror
of each other (Weber  [], p. ). But it is also plainly open
to misanthropic and hostile feelings to which, in the case of SARS,
even the health workers were not immune. Medics were heroic only at a
distance. Close-up, they and their families were feared as likely bearers
of the mysterious killer virus. Those who had any close encounter with
SARS, be it former patients, relatives of patients and even some of the
medical staﬀ treating them were pariahs within a pariah community.
Consider the sobering cri de coeur of Leung Siu-hong a male nurse who
caught SARS while providing SARS patients with intubations in the
intensive care unit of the Princess Margaret Hospital:
The worst thing about contracting SARS [for me] was not all the suﬀering but the
fact that my family experienced a lot of discrimination when I was sick. When my
sister told her boss that I had contracted SARS her colleagues started avoiding her
and saying many mean things to her. But my family was too scared to tell me. I
can’t believe that after risking my life to help others, my family ended up being
discriminated against. Every time I hear people talking about how they support
health workers I feel sick to my stomach. They are all worthless lies. In reality, they
treat us like lepers or monsters...You don’t need to express your support and gra-
titude. We are just doing our job. We are not working for applause or praise. All we
want is to be treated like normal people. I don’t want to see protests from residents
who don’t want our dorms to be near their homes. It really attacks our morale.
Many colleagues go to work every day and undergo self-exile without a deadline.
It’s worse than being infected ().
Similar expressions of disdain and anger were ventilated by many of
those who inhabited SARS aﬀected estates. A survey of Amoy Gardens
residents, conducted in August  by the Mood Disorders Centre of
the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and which focused on the impact
of SARS during the month of April, found widespread ostracism. More
than  % of the  residents interviewed reported that friends had
rejected dinner invitations from them; roughly the same percentage felt
compelled to conceal their place of abode when eating out or visiting a
doctor;  % were denied home maintenance or delivery services; and
() I am greatly simplifying Turner’s
discussion. Even so, the ‘‘community’’ of
which I write has substantially little in
common with his three models of com-
munitas: existential, normative, and
ideological (Turner  []).
() ‘‘Behind the Mask,’’ South China
Morning Post, May , , C.
  
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 % told of being denied entry to hotels or enduring discriminatory
treatment in medical clinics ().
A second objection is that the notion of a community of fate is com-
promised by its very generality. It is simply unrealistic. No situation
embraces everyone in the same way or the same degree. Look for
exceptions, and you will ﬁnd them, but this is true of all the concepts of
sociology. There are always people who are not afraid, who do not wear
masks, or who wear them ironically in customized colors. Some people
are better resourced and have more opportunities for ﬂight than others;
closure has its limits. Hence, in Hong Kong, many expatriate families
ﬂed for home, returning when the worst appeared to be over. But the
chasing of anomalies is sociologically uninteresting unless it too forms
some kind of pattern; ‘‘contingency’’ is the word we give to situations
still unexplained. I began by saying that a community of fate is some-
thing local and situational, based in a particular place and time. It is
grounded in a temporal and spatial ‘‘we’’ and the pre-political loyalties
that sustain it. Its existence depends on micro processes that are both
shaped from the outside (the collision with danger, closure) and unfurl
from within (notably, social ritual). On this account, a community of
fate, like pearls on a string, is composed of all those people, and just
those people, who are aﬀected and linked by all seven features that I
mentioned earlier. Just as evidently, communities of fate build on extant
social materials; they do not spring out of nowhere. But nor do they
simply distil, and render visible, a set of pre-existent social materials. On
the contrary, communities of fate reconﬁgure social life itself, reshuﬀle
and reprioritize its elements, and bring into being something new and
unexpected.
A third objection to the notion of community of fate is epistemolo-
gical. It will occur to all social scientists of an individualistic and nomi-
nalist persuasion who ﬁnd Durkheimian ontology ‘‘mystical’’ and who
deplore ‘‘collective concepts’’. Can the concept of community of fate
convince such a person? Probably not. Transform it, then, into an
ideal-type. From that vantage point, particular crisis communities can
be calibrated against the seven analytical ingredients mentioned pre-
viously. One seeks deviations from the ‘‘model’’ so as to highlight cases
of historical speciﬁcity. Consider two situations: the Forest Jews of
Belarus and the Warsaw Ghetto.
The so-called Forest Jews were a community of Jews, and a few
Gentiles, that survived Nazi occupation by hiding in the puscha (dense
() ‘‘Amoy Gardens’ post-traumatic
SARS disorder’’, by Klaudia Lee, South
China Morning Post, December , ,
A.
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foliage) surrounding the Belarus towns of Novogrudek and Lida. By
July , when the Red Army evicted German forces from the region,
it comprised around , persons. This ‘‘Jerusalem’’, as its denizens
called it, contained most of the ingredients of a community of fate that I
mentioned above. Its members were a stigmatized group. They joined
the wooded Jerusalem because of their belief that conditions in their
town were so hazardous as to demand their attention and action. Many
endured forest life for two and a half years. They mobilized resources by
living oﬀ the land, erecting shelter and expropriating food and goods
from nearby farms. And their localization (albeit one of mobility among
the forests) eventuated in a small town with its own division of labor. It
contained:
Living quarters; workshops for tailors, shoemakers, seamstresses and carpenters; a
large herd of cows and horses; a school for sixty children; a main street and a central
square; a musical and dramatic theater; and a tannery that doubled as a synagogue.
(Duﬀy , p. xi)
Of special signiﬁcance, and without which the community would
never have existed or survived, was the indefatigable leadership of three
brothers: Tuvia, Zus and Asael Bielski. Their knowledge of the terrain,
vision, daring, willingness to prosecute a guerrilla war against the inva-
ders, rather than succumb to apathy, were the sine qua non of the Forest
Jews. The Bielski brothers also led with an iron ﬁst and tolerated little
dissension; to that extent, however, the band approximates a regimented
group. Social ritual revolved around daily watches for the enemy and
deference paid to the rules of camp life. And what did the Forest Jews
accomplish? They retained their freedom at a time, and under condi-
tions, calculated to destroy it.
A far more interesting case, precisely because it ﬁts fewer ideal-
typical dimensions of community of fate (thereby prompting us to
probe deeper) is that of the Warsaw Ghetto. ‘‘Ale glach! Ale glach!’’ ().
So shouted the Ghetto’s equivalent of the medieval Fool. But was this
() Yiddish for ‘‘All alike! All alike!’;
German: ‘‘Alle gleich! Alle gleich!’’ See
Reich-Ranicki ( [], p. ) on
which the following account relies,
together with Mazor ( []). Both
authors were conﬁned in the Ghetto and
have produced luminous, yet hard-
headed, accounts of it. I note in passing
that Mazor’s work brims with references
to ‘‘fate’’ as on pp. -, , , ,
, , , . On pp. - he
remarks that ‘‘All the occupants of the
Warsaw ghetto were united by a common
fate. They lived on a ship that was about
to sink... [C]orruption and demoraliza-
tion never penetrated deeply into the
general population. Most people showed
tremendous tenacity and great resolve...
Also, they created, amazing, highly spe-
ciﬁc institutions of public relief... It was
the popular forces in the ghetto that bred
and nurtured the heroic resistance
against the Germans in the unforgettable
days of April and May ’’.
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true? On the face of it, the Warsaw Ghetto contained many of the pro-
perties required of a community of fate. Established in October 
and demolished in April/May , the Ghetto was a cramped space
which at its peak contained possibly , inhabitants. It was mate-
rially bound by a wall and other constrictions. It consisted of a stigma-
tized group. It was active, with many emergent associations springing up
to face calamity. The Ghetto hosted not only orchestras, but also created
vibrant and highly active social institutions (notably, mutual aid and
tenement committees) ¢ revealingly describe by Mazor ( [],
pp. , ) as ‘‘new forces’’, the ‘‘spontaneous manifestation’’ of
‘‘humanism and solidarity’’. Political groups such as left-wing Zionists
continued to exist. And, of course, the Ghetto produced the remarkable
and bloody uprising against the Nazis.
Closure was another obvious ingredient. Mazor ( [], pp. ,
) characterized the Ghetto as a ‘‘hermetically-sealed universe’’ or a
‘‘sealed coﬀin’; in fact, it allowed some degree of porousness between the
Ghetto’s membrane and its hinterland. People left the Ghetto to work
and some never returned; food, clothes and weapons were smuggled in.
Yet within the penumbra of the Todeskästchen (‘‘death chest’’) as the
Nazis called it, the Ghetto was a deeply stratiﬁed place. It contained
stark contrasts between the starving and those still able, as a result of
smuggling or corruption, to eat delicacies. It contained Jews of many
areas, occupations and languages whose plight was by no means uni-
form. Take occupation: doctors, dentists, carpenters, plumbers, electri-
cians, tailors and shoemakers were in far greater demand, and thus better
oﬀ, than teachers and lawyers. But most conspicuous of all was the fact
that much of the political authority and coercion that existed in the
Ghetto was devolved by the Nazis on to Jews themselves. The Jewish
Councils were widely distrusted; the Jewish ‘‘police’’ or militia univer-
sally hated outside their own small circles. By using Jewish auxiliaries,
the Nazis deliberately created the conditions of division. This also
complicated and impaired danger-recognition. To be sure, everyone
knew that they faced a terrible threat. Reich-Ranicki (, p. )
observes that ‘‘weighing’’ on everyone, ‘‘whether young or old, whether
clever or stupid was a dark and terrible shadow from which there was no
escape ¢ the shadow of the fear of death’’. Mazor concurs: the City of
Death was rank with fear. Yet the Nazis’ practice of granting exceptions
to camp deportation for a few ‘‘privileged’’ groups fractured solidarity.
Temporarily extended to employees of the Jewish Council, policemen,
hospital staﬀs and others of immediate utility, this ‘‘torture by hope’’,
this oscillation between ‘‘provisional life’’ and ‘‘instant death’’, left its
 
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agents desperate but socially splintered (). Social diﬀerentiation is
certainly compatible with a community of fate. It was not diﬀerentiation
but divisiveness that reduced the scope of solidarity in the Ghetto, a
ﬁssiparousness that the Nazis deliberately engineered. And the situation
of discord and separation was aggravated by an epidemic of typhus that
induced further social repulsion and disarray.
This is an incomplete picture of a complex situation. Much more
needs to be learned about the codes of representation, the social lan-
guage, employed by the Ghetto’s residents. A detailed sociological ana-
lysis would begin by noting, for instance, that ‘‘Warsaw Ghetto’’ was
itself a Jewish self-description, alluding to the historical experiences of
the Jews over many centuries. The Nazis, in contrast, avoided this term
and referred instead to the walled environment as the ‘‘Jewish Quarter’’.
A closer analysis than I have provided would, I am conﬁdent, also show
the widespread use of neologisms, a local argot and ritual that was
speciﬁc to the conditions encountered by the entrapped Jews. It might
be objected that the reason why the Warsaw Ghetto was only dubiously a
community of fate, while the Forest Jews were, ideal typically, very close
to being one is simply a matter of scale. There is some truth in this. The
greater the numbers and internal complexity of a group, the more dif-
ficult it is for a community of fate to form. Yet while small size may be a
propitious condition for a community of fate, it is neither a necessary
nor, of course, a suﬀicient one. Much of Hong Kong, I have already
argued, approximated a community of fate during the SARS outbreak
of . Conversely, the smallest units of embattled people may fail to
create one. We have only to read Victor Klemperer’s account of the
so-called Jews’ Houses in Dresden to get a sense of this. True, Klem-
perer was the kind of person to especially loathe the ‘‘promiscuity’’ of
the Houses, that is, their chronic lack of privacy and indiscretion. But his
portrait suggests a more general malaise: ‘‘Many of the people with
whom we would gladly live in peace, are at daggers drawn, slander one
another. Cohn curses the Stühlers ¢ ‘they’re just Bavarians, that’s all!’,
Konrad and Berger rave at one another’’ (Klemperer  pp. -
).
() On ‘‘torture by hope’’ and privi-
leged categories, see Mazor ( [],
p. ). On ‘‘provisional life’’ and ‘‘ins-
tant death’’ and the Nazi deﬁnition of
‘‘useful Jews’’, see Reich-Ranicki (
[], pp. -).
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Conclusion
If ‘‘community of fate’’ fails to shed light on situations of social
duress, on the dynamics of groups facing a radical challenge to their
existence, it is simply redundant. If, however, the concept enables us to
understand at least some aspects of crisis conditions, it will have done a
little work for students of emergency. Both realist and nominalist
approaches to the subject are possible and, under diﬀerent logical pro-
tocols, valuable. That pragmatic compatibility is fortunate. For war,
terror, epidemic and other ‘‘natural’’ disasters continue to haunt our
times. As sociologists, we need urgently to develop concepts that explain
the range, type, and consequences of emergency responses: we are, alas,
bound to see more of them soon. Professionally, we need to build bridges
between mainstream sociology and the work being done by disaster
specialists in such outlets as the International Journal of Mass Emergen-
cies and Disasters ().
My focus on Hong Kong during the SARS outbreak is only a starting
point. How did people respond to the London plague of  and its
counterpart in Marseilles during ? What were the social dynamics
of Parisians during the Commune of ? Does disease produce
a diﬀerent kind of collective response than military invasion, as for
instance in Nanking, the Chinese city facing the Japanese Imperial
Army in , or Leningrad under siege from the Wehrmacht in ?
At what point, and under what conditions, does a group disintegrate or
reassert itself with new-found energy? A particular area that requires
further elaboration is the relationship between community of fate and
the character of the host society. For instance, how does the nature of a
group’s axis of convergence aﬀect a community of fate? Does ethnicity
have diﬀerent consequences from those of language or confession?
These and other unanswered questions indicate that community of fate
is a concept very much in the making. It is still rough and largely
untested. I ask others to help make it more serviceable or replace it with
something better.
() See also the papers edited by Quarantelli (a pioneer in disaster research) .
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